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The ideas of ‘responsible development’ in the scientific-technological advance and of 
‘responsible innovation’ in the field of new products, services and systems have been 
discussed for some years now with increasing intensity (Siune et al. 2009) and led to 
the phrase of ‘Responsible Research and Innovation’ (RRI).2 The postulate of 
responsible innovation adds explicit ethical reflection to Technology Assessment (TA) 
and science, technology and society (STS) studies and includes all of them into 
integrative approaches to shaping technology and innovation. Responsible innovation 
brings together TA with its experiences on assessment procedures, actor involvement, 
foresight and evaluation with ethics, in particular under the framework of responsibility, 
and also builds on the body of knowledge about R&D and innovation processes provided 
by STS and STIS studies (science, technology, innovation and society). Ethical reflection 
and technology assessment are increasingly taken up as integrative part of R&D 
programmes (Siune et al. 2009). Science institutions, including research funding 
agencies, have started taking a pro-active role in promoting integrative research and 
development.3 Thus, the governance of science and of R&D processes is changing which 
opens up new possibilities and opportunities for involving new actors and new types of 
reflection. 
In this paper4 I want to demonstrate at a more conceptual level that Responsible 
Innovation can build on experiences and knowledge provided by the three mentioned 
fields of research: ethics, technology assessment, and STS respective STIS studies. To 
                                                 
2  In this paper I will usually speak of ‘Responsible Innovation’ but including also early stages 
of development and research. 
3  See the ‘Responsible Innovation’ programme of the Dutch science foundation NWO as an 
example. 
4  Because of several parallel publication projects in the field of RRI I cannot avoid some 
overlap with other publications. In particular, there are parallels with Grunwald 2011b in the field 
of responsibility; with Grunwald 2012a with respect to conceptual issues of RRI; and with 
Grunwald 2012b concerning Technology Assessment as major source of RRI.  
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this end I will start by a brief analysis of the thematic dimensions included in the notion 
of responsibility and the respective disciplinary approaches to explore and investigate 
them (Sec. 2). The field of technology assessment is then introduced as a major origin 
of the Responsible Innovation movement including already some of the main ideas 
behind Responsible Innovation (Sec. 3). Based on the TA tradition Responsible 
Innovation may be characterized as a broadened extension of technology assessment 
complemented by ethics and STS (Sec. 4). As an illustration, the field of Synthetic 
Biology is introduced (Sec. 5). 
 
 
Key-words:  responsible innovation, Technology Assessment, ethics, governance, science 
& technology 
JEL codes: O32, P40, Y8 
 
 
The notion of Responsibility 
The concept of responsibility has been used widely in connection with scientific and 
technological progress in the past two to three decades (Durbin/Lenk 1987). It 
associates ethical questions regarding the justifiability of decisions in and on science 
and technology with the actions and decisions of concrete persons and groups and 
resulting accountabilities, and it is faced with the challenges posed by uncertain 
knowledge of the consequences of those decisions.  
The term of ‘responsibility’ seems to be an everyday word not needing any explanation 
at all. However, this might be a misleading assumption in the field of science and 
technology (following Grunwald 1999). Responsibility is result of an act of attribution, 
either if actors themselves take over responsibility, or if the attribution of responsibility 
is made by others. The attribution of responsibility is itself an act that takes place 
relative to rules of attribution (on this also see Jonas 1979, p. 173). Assignments and 
attributions of responsibility take place in concrete social and political spaces involving 
and affecting concrete actors in concrete constellations. They may change the 
governance of a specific field, and often the explicit reflection on and attribution of 
responsibility shall influence the governance of decision-making in that field (e.g. in 
synthetic biology, see Sec. 5). 
The notion of responsibility often is characterized by reconstructions making the places 
in a sentence explicit which must be filled in to cover the intentions valid in a particular 
responsibility context (Lenk 1992). A four-place reconstruction seems to be suitable 
for discussing issues of responsibility in scientific and technical progress: 
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• someone (an actor, e.g. a scientist or an engineer) assumes responsibility 
for  
• something (such as the results of actions or decisions, e.g. for avoiding 
safety or security problems) relative to a  
• body of rules (laws, norms, principles, values and customs) and relative to 
the 
• quality of available knowledge about the consequences of the actions 
(deterministic, probabilistic or possibilistic knowledge (Betz 2010). 
 
While the first two places are more or less trivial in order to make sense of the word 
“responsible”, the third and fourth places open up essential dimensions of 
responsibility: the normative rules comprise principles, norms and values being 
decisive for the judgment whether a specific action or decision is regarded responsible 
or not – this place constitutes the moral dimension of responsibility. The knowledge 
available and its quality including all the uncertainties form its epistemic dimension. 
Reminding the initial observation that the attribution of responsibility is a socially and 
politically relevant act and influences the governance of the respective field, it comes 
out as a main result that all three dimensions must be considered in prospective 
debates over responsibility in science and technology (Grunwald 2011b):  
 
• the governance dimension of responsibility mirrors the fact that the 
attribution of responsibility is an act done by specific actors and affecting 
others. Attributing responsibilities must, on the one hand, take into 
account the possibilities of actors to influence actions and decisions in the 
respective field. On the other, attributing responsibilities has an impact on 
the governance of that field. Relevant questions are: How are the 
capabilities to act and decide distributed in the field considered? Which 
social groups are affected and could or should help decide about the 
distribution of responsibility? Do the questions under consideration 
concern the “polis” or can they be delegated to groups or subsystems? 
What consequences would a particular distribution of responsibility have 
for the governance of the respective field? 
• the moral dimension of responsibility is addressed by the question whether 
actions and decisions should be regarded responsible relative to the body 
of rules. Insofar as normative uncertainties arise (Grunwald 2011a, Ch. 3), 
e.g., because of moral conflicts or indifference, ethical reflection on these 
rules is needed. Relevant questions are: What criteria allow distinguishing 
between responsible and irresponsible actions and decisions? Which 
traditions such as Kantian or utilitarian ethics should be involved and what 
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would follow? Is there consensus or controversy on these criteria among 
the relevant actors? Can the actions and decisions in question be justified 
with respect to the rules, values and ethical principles?  
• the epistemic dimension asks for the quality of the knowledge about the 
subject of responsibility. This is a relevant issue in debates on scientific 
responsibility because frequently statements about impacts and 
consequences of science and new technology show a high degree of 
uncertainty (von Schomberg 2005). The comment that nothing else comes 
from “mere possibility arguments” (Hansson 2006) is an indication that in 
debates over responsibility it is essential that the status of the available 
knowledge is critically reflected from epistemological points of view. 
Relevant questions are: What is really known about prospective subjects of 
responsibility? What could be known in case of more research, and which 
uncertainties are pertinent? How can different uncertainties be qualified 
and compared to each other? And what is at stake if hypothetical worse-
case scenarios would come to reality? 
 
 
This brief analysis shows that issues of responsibility are inevitably interdisciplinary 
touching upon all of these dimensions. The issue is not one of abstract ethical 
judgments but entails the observance of concrete contexts and governance factors as 
well as of the quality of the knowledge available. Responsible Innovation must be 
aware of this complex semantic nature of responsibility which requires inter- and 
trans-disciplinary approaches. In particular, a cooperation of applied ethics addressing 
the moral dimension, philosophy of science taking care of the epistemic dimension and 
social science (STS) researching the social and political dimension as well as 
governance issues is needed. In the following I will give some arguments that parts of 
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Technology Assessment as origin of Responsible 
Innovation 5 
 State of art 
 
Technology Assessment emerged in the 1970s in the United States as a science-based 
and policy-advising activity (Bimber 1996) with the Office of Technology Assessment 
at the Congress as the first TA institution. In its first period technology was regarded 
to follow its own dynamics (technology determinism) with the consequence that 
shaping technology in the sense of RRI was not an issue. The main task of TA in that 
time was seen in its early-warning function in order to enable political actors to 
undertake measure to, for example, compensate of prevent anticipated negative 
impacts of technology. This changed completely during the 1980s following the social 
constructivist paradigm emphasising the ‘shaping of technology’ according to social 
needs and values (Bijker et al. 1987; Bijker/Law 1994). In this framework the 
approach of Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA) was developed (Rip et al. 
1995). CTA started considering technology development and innovation processes 
(Smits/ten Hertog 2007). TA for orientating giving shape to new technology and 
possibly resulting innovations is since then part of the overall TA portfolio. New and 
additional motivations entered the field of TA over the past decades (Grunwald 
2012a): 
 
 Concerns of an emerging technocracy: repeatedly there have been 
concerns that the scientific and technological advance could threaten the 
functioning of democracy because only few experts were capable of really 
understanding the complex technologies (Habermas 1970). One of the 
many origins of TA is to counteract and to enable and empower society to 
take active roles in democratic deliberation on science and technology (von 
Schomberg 1999).  
                                                 
5
  This Section summarizes the description of TA given in Grunwald 2012a and 2012b. For a 
general and more detailed introduction into TA see Grunwald 2009. 
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 Experiences of technology conflicts: little acceptance of some decisions on 
technology (such as on nuclear power in some countries), doubts about 
their legitimacy and resulting conflicts motivated TA to think about 
procedures of conflict prevention and resolution, in particular involving 
participatory approaches (Joss/Belucci 2002).  
 Shaping technology according to social values: If technology could be 
designed according to social values, so the hope, problems of rejection or 
conflict would no longer occur at all. This line of thought seems to be one 
of the main sources of Responsible Innovation. 
 Innovation issues: in the past decade TA is increasingly considered part of 
regional and national innovation systems (Smits/ten Hertog 2007).  
 Shift in the societal communication on new and emerging science and 
technology (NEST): techno-visionary sciences such as nanotechnology, 
converging technologies, enhancement technologies and synthetic biology 
entered the arena. The widespread use of visions and metaphors became 
an important factor in societal debates (Grunwald 2007; Selin 2007). 
Technology Assessment today constitutes an interdisciplinary research field aiming at, 
generally speaking, providing knowledge for better-informed and well-reflected 
decisions concerning new technologies (Grunwald 2009a). Its initial and still valid 
motivation is to provide answers to the emergence of unintended and often 
undesirable side effects of science and technology (Bechmann et al. 2007). TA shall 
add reflexivity to technology governance (Aichholzer et al. 2010) by integrating any 
available knowledge on possible side effects, by supporting the evaluation of 
technologies according to societal values and ethical principles, by elaborating 
strategies to deal with inevitable uncertainties, and by contributing to constructive 
solutions of societal conflicts around science and technology. There are four partially 
overlapping branches of TA addressing different targets in the overall technology 
governance: TA as policy advice, TA as medium of participation, TA for shaping 
technology directly, and TA in innovation processes (following Grunwald 2012a/b):  
(1) TA has initially been conceptualised as policy advice (Bimber 1996, 
Grunwald 2009a). The objective is to support policymakers in addressing the 
above-mentioned challenges by exploring political measures such as adequate 
regulation (e.g. the Precautionary Principle), by reflecting priority-setting in 
research funding, and by developing strategies towards sustainable 
development. In this mode of operation TA does not directly address 
technology development but considers the boundary conditions of technology 
development and use. 
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(2) Participatory TA developed approaches to involve citizens, consumers and 
users, actors of civil society, stakeholders, the media and the public in 
different roles at different stages in technology governance. The participation 
of citizens and of those affected is believed to improve the knowledge basis as 
well as the values fundament on which judgements are based and decisions 
are made. Several approaches and methods have been developed and applied 
in the recent years, such as consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, and focus 
groups (Joss/Belucci 2002).   
(3) Building on research on the genesis of technology made in the framework 
of social constructivism (Bijker et al. 1987) the idea of shaping technology 
due to social expectations and values came up and motivated the 
development of several approaches such as Constructive TA (CTA) or Social 
Shaping of Technology (Yoshinaka et al. 2003). They all aim at increasing 
reflexivity in technology development and engineering by addressing the level 
of concrete products, systems and services, going for a “better technology in 
a better society” (Rip et al. 1995).  
(4) As is well known the ‘supply side’ of science and technology and the 
societal ‘demand’ do not always correspond, and scientific-technical 
inventions do not automatically lead to successful and economically profitable 
innovations. TA regarding the entire innovation process is expected to 
improve this situation (Smits/den Hertog 2007). 
In order to make TA work in specific projects, a set of methods has been developed in 
the form of a “method toolbox” (see Decker/Ladikas 2004). The methods applied in 
TA are research methods, interactive methods and communication methods. Research 
methods are applied to TA problems in order to collect data, to facilitate predictions, 
to do quantitative risk assessment, to allow for the identification of economic 
consequences, to investigate social values or acceptance problems and to do eco-
balancing. Interactive, participatory or dialogue methods are needed to organise 
social interaction in such a way as to facilitate conflict management, allow for conflict 
resolution, bring scientific expertise and citizens together, involve stakeholders in 
decision-making processes and mobilise citizens to shape society’s future. 
Communication should be seen as a two-way process. On the one hand 
communication methods are used to communicate the corporate image of a TA 
institute, the TA approach, the TA process and the TA product to the outside world so 
as to increase the impact of TA. On the other hand communication is important for 
enabling the TA institute to keep in touch with the outside world and thus with reality. 
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Responsible innovation draws on the body of knowledge and experience provided by 
TA’s history over decades and on the methodological toolbox – but also extends the 
scope of consideration to ethical issues of responsibility and to broader governance 




The emergence of Responsible Innovation (Siune et al. 2009) reflects the diagnosis that 
available approaches to shape science and technology still do not meet all of the far-
ranging expectations towards technology governance and achieving a “better technology 
in a better society” (Rip et al. 1995). The hope behind the Responsible Innovation 
movement is that new – or further-developed – approaches could add considerably to 
existing approaches such as TA and engineering ethics. Indeed, compared to earlier 
approaches such as SST or CTA there are shifts of accentuation and new focuses of 
emphasis (Grunwald 2012a): 
• “Shaping innovation” complements or even replaces the former slogan 
“shaping technology” which characterised the social constructivist 
approach to technology. This shift reflects the insight that it is not 
technology as such which influences society and therefore should be 
shaped according to society’s needs, expectation and values, but it is 
innovation by which technology and society interact as has been pointed 
out by many STIS studies. 
• There is a closer look on societal contexts of new technology and science. 
Responsible Innovation can be regarded as a further step towards taking 
the demand pull perspective and social values in shaping technology and 
innovation more serious.6  
• Instead of distant observation following classical paradigms of science 
there is now a clear indication for intervention into the development and 
innovation process: Responsible Innovation projects shall “make a 
                                                 
6  An expression of this shift was the strong role of the Societal Panel in the 
application phase of the NWO programme ‘Responsible Innovation’ mentioned above.  
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difference” not only in terms of research but also as interventions into the 
“real world”.7 
• The spectrum of stakeholders to be involved in participatory processes and 
dialogue is to be broadened further because of new forms of science and 
technology governance (Siune et al. Chap. 3 and 4). 
• Following the above-mentioned issues, Responsible Innovation can be 
regarded as a radicalisation of the well-known post-normal science 
(Funtowicz/Ravetz 1993) being even closer to social practice, being 
prepared for intervention and for taking responsibility for this intervention. 
However, what „responsible“ in a specific context means and what distinguishes 
“responsible” from “irresponsible” or less responsible innovation is difficult to identify. 
The distinction will strongly depend on values, rules, customs but also on the 
knowledge available and its validity, and will vary according to different context and 
actor conditions. Taking the three dimensions of responsibility (Sec. 2) seriously leads 
to the conclusion that Responsible Innovation unavoidably requires a more intense 
inter- and trans-disciplinary cooperation between engineering, social sciences, and 
applied ethics. The major novelty in this interdisciplinary cooperation might be the 
integration of ethics (normative reflection on responsibilities) and social sciences such 
as STS and governance research (empirically dealing with social processes around the 
attribution of responsibility and their consequences for governance). This integration 
is at the heart of Responsible Innovation – and a major obstacle might be that applied 
ethics and social sciences have to deal with deep-ranging controversies and mutual 
antipathy (Grunwald 1999). It will be one of the most exciting challenges in which 
way these obstacles might be overcome. 
 
 Responsible innovation – the moral dimension 
 
The great majority of technology-relevant decisions can be classified as “business as 
usual” or “standard situation in moral respect” in the following sense (Grunwald 2000; 
Grunwald 2011a): the normative aspects of the basis for the decision including 
                                                 
7
  This is reflected by the strong role of the Valorisation Panels in the projects of the NWO 
programme ‘Responsible Innovation’. 
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assumptions about responsibility are not made the object of special reflection, but 
accepted as given in the respective situation, thereby also accepting the elements of the 
normative framework this entails. The demands on the normative framework which 
define a business-as-usual situation are formulated more precisely by the criteria 
(expanding on Grunwald 2000; Grunwald 2011a) of Pragmatic Completeness; Local 
Consistency; Sufficient Lack of Ambiguity; Acceptance and Compliance. If these 
conditions are satisfied in a specific context, then neither moral conflicts nor ambiguities 
exist. There is, consequently, no need for explicit ethical reflection and thinking about 
responsibilities.  
However, science and technology can challenge and possibly “disturb” business as usual 
situations in moral respect, transform them into non-standard situations and make 
ethical and responsibility reflection necessary (Grunwald 2011a). Then, moral 
ambiguities, conflicts on responsibility and indifferences, as well as new challenges for 
which moral customs have yet to be established or where there are doubts as to whether 
established moral traditions apply. In the following, I will refer to such situations as 
situations of normative uncertainty – then it will be a matter of debate, inquiry or 
controversy what should be regarded as responsible and what as irresponsible. In this 
modified situation, there are simply three options to choose from: 
• The techno-sceptic and more conservative approach: reject the innovation 
causing moral trouble – renounce its possible benefits and maintain the 
initial normative framework. As a rule, this option is chosen if there are 
strong, i.e., categorical, ethical arguments against the new technology. An 
example is reproductive cloning. Such cloning or research on cloning is 
prohibited in many countries for ethical reasons. Although Habermas‘ 
(2001) argument against interventions in the germ line also claims to be 
such a strong argument, in discussions it is an object of controversy. 
• The constructive approach: Try to modify the properties of the innovation 
responsible for causing moral trouble (maybe circumstances of its 
production involving animal experiments or the location of a nuclear waste 
disposal site in a sacred region of indigenous people) in order to be able to 
harvest the expected benefits without causing moral trouble. The option of 
shaping technology specifically according to ethical values or principles is 
behind the approaches of constructive technology assessment (CTA; see 
Rip et al. 1995), of the social shaping of technology (Yoshinaka et al. 
2003), and of value sensitive design (van de Poel 2009, pp. 1001ff.). The 
focus is on directing the shaping of technical products or systems along 
the relevant factors of the normative framework so that the products or 
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systems fit the framework. This would so to speak in itself prevent 
normative uncertainty from arising. 
• The techno-optimistic approach: Modify the normative framework, so that 
the new technology could be accepted (and the benefits harvested) in a 
way that would not lead to normative uncertainty and moral conflict. 
Frequently there are even more complex necessities to balance factors, 
such as when the (highly promising) use of a new technology or even 
research on it is not possible except by producing normative uncertainty. 
Examples are animal experiments undertaken for non-medical purposes 
(Ferrari et al. 2010) or research in which the moral status of embryos 
plays a role. The issue is then to examine if and to what extent the 
affected normative framework can be modified without coming into conflict 
with the essential ethical principles. Even the handling of technical risks 
that have to be tolerated in order to utilize an innovation often takes place 
by means of modifying the normative framework, such as in the 
implementation of precautionary measures. 
 
Responsibility reflection plays a different role, however, in each of these options. The 
results of the reflection have to be introduced to the different fields of action (e.g., 
politics, economics and law) which relates the moral dimension of responsibility to the 
governance dimension. 
 
 Responsible innovation – the epistemic dimension 
 
The subjects in responsibility debates in the field of new and emerging science and 
technology (NEST) often consist of assumptions about future developments. 
Expectations, fears, concerns and hopes play a role while reliable knowledge about those 
future developments usually is hard or even impossible to achieve. Therefore, the subject 
of responsibility is only known to a limited degree of knowledge. A fundamental problem 
of responsibility debates about far-ranging future developments in science and 
technology such as visions is the inevitably high degree to which material other than 
knowledge is involved.  
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An interesting epistemological controversy concerning ethical reflection on 
nanotechnology was recently subject to the debate about “speculative nano-ethics” 
(Nordmann 2007, Grunwald 2010). The critics of speculative nanoethics pointed out that 
no legitimate conclusions could be drawn if the ethical reflection addresses merely 
speculative and arbitrary futures (“mere possibility arguments,” cf. Hansson 2006). In 
order to circumvent this criticism, explorative philosophy (Grunwald 2011a, Ch. 10) must 
not be epistemologically blind but has to develop and apply methods and procedures for 
assessing the degree of rationality behind images of uncertain futures. It must clarify the 
cognitive and normative content of the partially speculative future conditions and 
consequences of nanotechnology:  
Instead of welcoming without scrutiny anyone who cares to add to the stock of 
promises and concerns about nanotechnology, we need to encourage discussions about 
quality of promises. (Nordmann/Rip 2009, 274)  
 
The epistemological task is to examine both the cognitive and evaluative content of 
the prospective knowledge which to be used in responsibility debates to describe the 
subject of responsibility. An epistemological “deconstruction” of prospective 
statements is necessary. Epistemological analysis of future knowledge and of 
expectations would initially have to uncover the cognitive content of the futures under 
considerations, i.e., the portions of knowledge and lack of knowledge that are 
involved, their respective premises, and the way they are combined to form coherent 
images of the future, such as scenarios. An important aspect would then be to 
examine the conditions needed for such futures to become reality and the periods of 
times that are involved. Furthermore, the normative content of the prospective 
knowledge would have to be reconstructed analytically: the images of a future society 
or of the development of man, and the possible diagnoses of current problems, the 
solutions to which are supposed to be facilitated by the more visionary developments. 
In this context the vision assessment approach has been proposed in order to uncover 
the epistemological and ethical grounding of visionary futures (Grin/Grunwald 2000; 
Grunwald 2009b). It aims at uncovering the epistemological and normative 
ingredients of future statements in order to permit better informed and more rational 
formation of opinion, assessment and decision making on the attribution of 
responsibilities. In this way, vision assessment can contribute to ethical and 
responsibility reasoning by helping to avoid running into the problem of dealing with 
“mere possible arguments” (Hansson 2006). 
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 Responsible innovation – the governance dimension 
 
Responsibility reflections take the perspective of a participant in ongoing debates 
over science, technology and innovation rather than merely being a distant observer. 
Thus responsibility reflection on technology and innovation are part of the overall 
technology governance. Responsibility inquiry into technology aims to influence the 
further course of development or, in short, to make an impact rather than being a 
mere ornament. Therefore, it has to be clarified how responsibility deliberations could 
take place and upon what grounds they could be founded but also how their results 
could enter decision-making processes.  
Entry points for responsibility reflections of technology and innovation are those 
situations in social praxis in which there is normative uncertainty on the basis of 
technological issues (see above). This determines who the partners are in an 
interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary dialogue which formulate the respective 
problem, provide information about the relevant contexts and are the addressees of 
advice concerning RRI. In the following I will briefly describe the most important of 
those entry points of the responsibility ethics of technology. 
Political Decisions: Since governmental technology policy creates obligations for 
everyone, the influence it exerts on technology in a morally pluralistic society is 
always a stage on which normative uncertainties will probably manifest themselves. 
Policy consultation by responsibility ethics can, for example, take place in the 
preparatory phase of legislation relevant to technology. Ethical advice that helps to 
overcome normative uncertainties in these areas can on the one hand be handled in 
the context of professional consultation on policy, such as in technology assessment 
(Grunwald 2009a). On the other, they can also be dealt with in ethically enlightened 
public debates and participatory processes.  
Entrepreneurial Decisions: The development of technology takes place primarily in 
the economy at market conditions. The shaping of technology and innovation by and 
in enterprises is operationalised by means of requirement specifications, project 
plans, and strategic entrepreneurial decisions. These in turn take place on the 
prescriptive basis of an enterprise’s headline goals, general principles, plan goals, and 
self-understanding but also including assumptions about later consumers of the 
technology and future market conditions.  
Engineering: Engineers and engineering scientists are confronted in a special way 
with attributions of having responsibility because of their close links with the 
processes of the development, production, utilization, and disposal of technology 
(Durbin/Lenk 1987; van Gorp 2005). Reflection on the moral foundations of 
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engineering activity also are a pragmatic location of the ethics of technology 
inasmuch as normative uncertainty arises during this activity, such as in cases of 
conflicts over the evaluation of safety and environmental issues between an engineer 
as an employee and the enterprise as the employer. 
Consumer Behaviour: The individual preferences of users and consumers of technical 
systems and products help determine the success of technology developments and 
innovation in two ways: first, by means of their purchasing and consumer behaviour, 
and second (and less noted), by means of their comments in market research. Their 
preferences contain moral backgrounds and values. In the purchase of an 
automobile, for example, criteria such as sportiness, cost, status, and environmental 
compatibility play a large role that varies from person to person. The influence on 
technological development and innovation resulting from consumer behaviour arises 
however almost naturally from the concurrence of the actual purchasing behaviour of 
many individual persons.  
Public Debate: The course of technical development is also decided by public debates, 
above all by those in the mass media. Public discussion in Germany influenced, for 
example, political opinion on nuclear energy, thus providing much of the basis for the 
recent decision to phase out atomic energy in that country. Similarly, the public 
discussion about genetically modified organisms has influenced the regulatory 
attitude of the European Union and the official acceptance of the precautionary 
principle. Most of the public debates conducted in the media have also influenced the 
shaping of the policy framework, with its indirect influence on technology.  
Technology governance is a complex interplay of interventions at all of these different 
levels. The governance dimension of RRI is thus confronted with the necessity to 
establish a complex view on the sharing of responsibilities and accountabilities among 
a large variety of actors.   
 
 
The RRI Case of Synthetic Biology 
The goal of Synthetic Biology is to employ technology to influence and shape living 
systems, allowing in some future also the creation of artificial life ‘from the scratch’. 
The question whether such developments are or could be made responsible has been 
raised in intensified form in view of the ever increasing extent of man’s interventions 
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in nature. The moral issues posed by synthetic biology resulting in challenges to 
responsibility can be classified according to the different normative frameworks and 
sets of rules that are affected: the question regarding how to deal with risks, 
normative uncertainties about the moral status of artificial living things, and 
questions of regarding the human hubris or “playing god” (Boldt et al. 2009; 
Grunwald 2011a, Ch. 7). Because of the (very) early stage of development the 
responsibility of research is still the main questions rather than responsible 
innovation issues. The research process including its organisation, the agenda-setting 
process and the possibility of external involvement (e.g. by CSOs) are the main items 
of discussion.8  
The responsibility of scientists at the lab will form a major issue in the run-up to 
genuine regulation and responsible research. In particular, issues of bio-safety and 
bio-security are frequently discussed (de Vriend 2006). The moral dimension which 
causes the necessity of ethical reflection in case of conflict touches questions such 
as: how safe is safe enough, what risk is acceptable according to which criteria, and 
is it legitimate to weigh up expected benefits with risks, or are there knock-out 
arguments morally forbidding cost/benefit comparisons? All these questions are well-
known from many other fields of risk ethics but must be answered anew in the 
particular context of synthetic biology. 
The production of new living things or technically strongly modified ones by synthetic 
biology will raise the question of their moral status. Insofar as with respect to their 
moral status a difference in principle is made between the living and nonliving objects 
of ethical reflection, the question will be whether synthetically produced living things 
are also accorded moral status. Dependent on assigning different moral statuses to 
such forms of “life” could lead to different answers on the questions for responsibility. 
In synthetic biology, man moves from being a modifier of what is present to a creator 
of something new: “In fact, if synthetic biology as an activity of creation differs from 
genetic engineering as a manipulative approach, the Baconian homo faber will turn 
into a creator” (Boldt/Müller 2008, p. 387). In 2005 a high-level expert group on 
behalf of the European Commission called it likely that work to create new life forms 
will give rise to fears, especially that of synthetic biologists “playing God.” Concerning 
responsibility issues the question could be (and is!) raised whether humans would 
run out of being able to act responsibly at all if they would start “Playing God”. 
                                                 
8  This Section summarizes diagnoses and findings published in Grunwald 2011a and 2011b. 
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However, most of the issues mentioned are highly uncertain as being parts of 
ongoing techno-visionary communication (Grunwald 2007). In the context of 
responsibility the question arises whether there is a clear issue at all for which 
responsibility can be taken or not. The following quote supports serious doubt about 
this:  
Fifty years from now, synthetic biology will be as pervasive and transformative 
as is electronics today. And as with that technology, the applications and impacts 
are impossible to predict in the field’s nascent stages. Nevertheless, the 
decisions we make now will have enormous impact on the shape of this future 
(Ilulissat Statement 2007, S. 2). 
The authors expect Synthetic Biology leading to deep-ranging and revolutionary 
changes with our today’ decisions having high impact on future development. If, 
however, their assumption that we do not know at all how those future impacts will 
look like would be true there wouldn’t be any chance to assign responsibilities, even 
to speak about responsibility wouldn’t be without any purpose because there wouldn’t 
be any valid subject to talk about. Any ethics of responsibility would be obsolete 
because of a missing subject (Bechmann 1993). The solution to this problem can be 
taken from the debate on speculative nano-ethics and its results so far (see Sec. 4) 
by differentiating responsibility issues with respect to the time-span of the involved 
concerns and by careful looking at the epistemic issues touched upon.  
Today responsibility considerations should relate, because of the epistemological 
problems of far-ranging expectation and concerns, mainly to research itself rather 
than to products and other innovations (IRCG 2009, p. 7). This diagnosis focuses the 
need for governance of synthetic biology on the necessity to debate the responsibility 
of scientists as individual professionals and of science as a system. Thus the focus 
here is on questions of the responsibility of the scientists and the disciplines involved, 
of the accountability of certain areas of research, and of the relationship between the 
self-regulation and self-obligation of science and state regulation. 
Self-obligations in science have come in for criticism in the field in Synthetic Biology. 
On the occasion of a conference on synthetic biology in 2006, 35 nongovernmental 
organizations (including the ETC Group, Greenpeace, and the Third World Network) 
wrote a joint letter critically reacting on a memorandum on the responsibility of 
Synthetic Biology (Maurer et al. 2006) which was approved at that conference. This 
letter is characterized overall by: 
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 Mistrust of scientific self-regulation and self-obligations. Such self-
governance is undemocratic as scientists should not be allowed to decide 
such far-reaching questions affecting their own activities. 
 Demands for a broad investigation of the social consequences of synthetic 
biology instead of restricting any investigation to abuse scenarios, e.g., by 
terrorists. 
 Emphasis on the necessity for including social groups in dialogs about the 
agenda of research and the handling of possible social consequences. 
 
 
The normative uncertainty and conflict that are symbolized by this letter and the 
activities at the second conference on synthetic biology concern the distribution of 
responsibilities for the further research process. What influence do scientists, the 
public, the state, or other social actors or areas have on the further course of events 
in synthetic biology in particular? Should there be a “policy of knowledge” (Stehr 
2004) that decides where the acquisition of knowledge is desirable and where it 
should be prevented? What role might this policy play? And how should responsibility 
and accountability consequently be distributed? All of the questions are highly 
relevant for the responsibility debate and are belonging to its socio-political 
dimension.  
Thus, both inter- and trans-disciplinary efforts are needed to be able to respond to 
the RRI challenge in this field. Neither individual scientists nor disciplines such as 
synthetic biology or even philosophy can address these questions alone with any 
prospect of success. When it comes to attributing responsibility, a broader approach 
is thus necessary, one that does justice to the realities of an extensive division of 
labour, citizens' claims for democratic participation, and the specific circumstances in 
the sciences. One of the demands for a transparent relationship between science, 
politics, and the public is for there to be deliberation about the agenda of science, in 
this case of synthetic biology, which is conducted in a democratic manner (Habermas 
1970). 
To take demands seriously for participation by a democratic public as well as for 
decision-making processes that are politically legitimized, however, does not lead to 
synthetic biology being freed of all responsibility. These fields are justifiably expected 
to provide transparent information to the public. The specific responsibility of 
scientists to provide information at an early stage lies in the fact that they possess 
particular cognitive competence in their own area and are the first to have certain 
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information. This responsibility also extends to participation in interdisciplinary and 
social dialogues and in political advice.  
Summarizing these thoughts briefly shows that it is essential to consider the moral, 
the epistemic, and the political dimension of responsibility altogether rather than 
restricting the debate to one or two of them. Taking this result seriously implies that 
responsibility issues should not be dealt with by ethicist only but by interdisciplinary 
teams involving also philosophers of science, political and social scientists, 





The terms of responsible development, responsible research and responsible 
innovation have been used over the last years to an increasing extent. These terms 
are highly integrative because they cover issues of engineering ethics, participation, 
technology assessment, anticipatory governance and science ethics. They include 
what has been stated in this paper: adding reflexivity to technology development and 
design (see also Voss et al. 2006). In this sense responsible development and 
innovation might be a new umbrella term (von Schomberg 2011) with new 
accentuations which may be characterized by:  
 involving ethical and social issues more directly in the innovation process 
by integrative approaches to development and innovation 
 bridging the gap between innovation practice, engineering ethics, 
technology assessment, governance research and social sciences (STS) 
 giving new shape to innovation processes and to technology governance 
according to responsibility reflections in all of its three dimensions 
mentioned above 
 in particular, making the distribution of responsibility among the involved 
actors as transparent as possible 
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 supporting “constructive paths” of the co-evolution of technology and the 
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